Even if it is assumed that Dressel did everything he had threatened in the letter of 7 June 2001, these acts did not reach the level of formality required by the Supreme Court to be “authorized by the union” or carried out by the union in its “official capacity”. Dressel`s refusal to refer the complainants and send a list of their names to the leaders of other residents for inclusion on the “black list” does not resemble an “established disciplinary procedure” and does not make the plaintiffs subject to a trade union “court” or a “procedure” allowing them to assert that they have been denied due process under Article 101(a)(5). Other courts of appeal have relied heavily on this factor. See z.B. United Food and Commercial Workers Int`l Union Local 911 v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int`l Union, 301 F.3d 468, 473-74 (6th Cir.2002) (finding that the applicant`s transfer of reprisals is not a “discipline” because it “was not the result of established union disciplinary proceedings”). The analysis presented in the Breininger is not so much about the occupation of the trade unionist`s complaint – the extent to which it collectively and officially characterises the Union`s actions – but about the nature of the Union`s conduct. The applicant failed to assert, let alone indicate, that the European Union, as an institution, deliberately voted in favour of an error in the presentation of the status of his complaint in a formal or informal procedure. We have this distinction in Brenner v.
Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir.1991). In the Brenner case, the plaintiffs filed a complaint LMRDA § 609 1 against their union, their residents and the native business agents, alleging that the business agent who managed the local`s hiring hall “disciplined” them by not sending them to employment, in retaliation for their political opposition to the agent and his union allies. We upheld the Granting of the Emergency Judgment by the District Court and found that, as in the Breininger case, the applicants “failed to assert the union`s actions in their official capacity and instead took only ad hoc retaliatory measures by the trade union official”. Id. at 1297. At the request of the defendant Local 164, the District Court issued a summary judgment on the plaintiffs` appeal under section 101(a)(5) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (5), their remedy for breach of the duty of fair representation and their rights to defamation under State law. The applicants, now plaintiffs, are four members of other local unions, under the aegis of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”), who worked as “voyageurs” at Local 164. . . .